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NEW MEXICO TAXATION & RE VENUE DEPARTMENT V.
BARNESANDNOBLE. COMLLC: RECONSIDERING THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IN AN E-COMMERCE
WORLD
ABSTRACT
Vacationing off the coast of Belize on a remote Central American
island, I bought a book from Amazon's website while on a dock 100
yards into the ocean. Within seconds the book was downloaded onto my
Kindle. From my hammock I marveled at the ease and simplicity of one-
click purchasing without even considering the tax implications.
My experience is far from unique. E-commerce is a way of life for
American consumers, which has tangible consequences for retailers and
states. Brick-and-mortar bookstores are forced out of business because of
online competition. Black Friday is not what it once was. Consumers
now wait until Cyber Monday to make their holiday purchases to avoid
long lines and sales taxes.
But our collective online shopping experience may soon change. A
number of states have passed the so-called "Amazon tax," which requires
Internet retailers to collect taxes if they have in-state affiliates. The Ama-
zon tax and similar laws are designed to make up for the more than $20
billion in revenue states are losing each year due to online commerce.
According to the Congressional Research Service, e-commerce has
caused states to lose out on almost a third of their total tax revenue. Be-
cause of the losses, many states are considering unconventional ways to
bring Internet retailers within their state's tax jurisdiction.
This Comment explains when the dormant Commerce Clause al-
lows states to tax Internet retailers. The New Mexico Supreme Court
faced that issue in New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department v.
Barnesandnoble.com LLC. The court held that New Mexico could im-
pose gross receipts tax on an Internet retailer because of a relationship
with an in-state sister corporation, which created a substantial nexus with
the state. This Comment analyzes the court's opinion and uses that case
as a lens to explore how other states deal with taxation of Internet retail-
ers. In particular, this Comment discusses a New York case where a
court found that the Amazon tax was constitutional and the U.S. Su-
preme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari in that case. This Comment
argues that the New Mexico decision provides a practical approach to
Internet retailer cases, including situations where retailers have affiliate
agreements with in-state residents. According to the New Mexico court,
there is a substantial nexus when a retailer "establish[es] and maintain[s]
a market" within a state because of the economic presence of the retailer.
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This Comment also contends that the Supreme Court missed an oppor-
tunity to modernize its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence when it
denied certiorari in the New York case. It should have replaced an out-
dated physical presence requirement with an economic presence test to
reflect the realities of the Digital Age.
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INTRODUCTION
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate inter-
state commerce.1 Implied in the Clause is the dormant Commerce Clause
(DCC), which forbids states from burdening interstate commerce.2
Courts have interpreted the DCC as prohibiting states from taxing Inter-
net retailers when doing so would interfere with interstate commerce.3 In
1967, in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,4 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a retailer had to be physically present within a
state to be subject to the state's tax jurisdiction without offending the
DCC.5 In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,6 the Court held
that the clause is not violated if a tax "is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State."7 In 1987, in Tyler Pipe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue,8 the Court held
that an out-of-state retailer's activities could produce a substantial nexus
if the "activities performed in [the] state on behalf of the taxpayer are
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and main-
tain a market" in the state.9 Then in 1992, in Quill Corp. v. North Dako-
ta,10 the Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess's bright-line rule, holding that a
physical presence is required to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement
of the DCC.11 The Court has not updated its DCC jurisprudence as ap-
plied to out-of-state retailers since Quill.
2
In the twenty-plus years since Quill, technological advancements
and electronic commerce (e-commerce) have drastically changed retail-
ers' ability to exploit state markets without being physically present.
Because Quill does not account for this change in the national economy,
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
3. See generally id. at 317-18 (holding that in order to be exposed to state sales and use
taxes, retailers must be physically present within the state).
4. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
5. Id. at 757-58.
6. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
7. Id. at 279.
8. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
9. Id. at 250-51 (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126
(Wash. 1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 232) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
11. See Emily L. Patch, Note, Online Retailers Battle with Sales Tax: A Physical Rule Living
in a Digital World, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 673, 684-85 (2013).
12. Congress has, however, taken up the issue of internet taxation. In 1998, Congress passed
the Internet Tax Freedom Act which bars states from taxing access to the Internet and placing multi-
ple or discriminatory taxes on e-commerce. Internet Tax Freedom Act §§ 1100, 1101, 47 U.S.C. §
151 note (1998). The Act did not apply to internet use and sales taxes. See Scott M. Edwards, Wash-
ington High Court Says Cable Internet Access Not Taxable as Telephone Utility Service, 19 J.
MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES 36, 36 (2009). Rather, it prohibited states from taxing consumers
as a result of making an online purchase or treating online shoppers differently. Id. The Act also
allows state taxation that is otherwise constitutionally permissible. Internet Tax Freedom Act §
1101(b).
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states have attempted to maneuver around strict adherence to the physical
presence requirement. There are three ways states have sought to find a
substantial nexus in order to tax out-of-state retailers: (1) through com-
mon ownership with in-state businesses, (2) through the economic pres-
ence of the retailer in the taxing state, and (3) through affiliate agree-
ments with in-state residents. The general trend is that states have devel-
oped their own methodologies to address Internet retailers. Moreover,
different courts have come to different conclusions as to the constitution-
ality of these taxation schemes, even with almost identical factual scenar-
ios.
This Comment argues that the solution to the Internet retailer taxa-
tion problem lies in the economic presence test, which considers the x-
tent of a business's economic contacts within a state, and better reflects
the realities of e-commerce in the Digital Age.1 3 In doing so, Part I of
this Comment examines the relevant DCC case law and presents the In-
ternet retailer and state taxation issue. Part II summarizes the facts, pro-
cedural history, and opinion of New Mexico Taxation & Revenue De-
partment v. Barnesandnoble. corn LLC (Barnesandnoble. corn I) ,14 which
held that a substantial nexus occurs when an Internet retailer "estab-
lish[es] and maintain[s] a market" in a state. 15 Part III argues that the
U.S. Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in a recent New York
case in order to overrule Quill's outdated physical presence requirement.
Finally, Part III concludes that the economic presence t st and the New
Mexico Supreme Court's holding provide a workable framework for
analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
In the context of the states' taxing powers, the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause are interrelated.6 Both clauses place limits on
the states' taxing authority.17 However, there are distinct differences as
well. 18 For instance, a state may have the power to tax certain taxpayers
without violating the Due Process Clause, yet that same tax may offend
the Commerce Clause.1 9 This Part is concerned primarily with the DCC
and its relation to states' taxing powers over out-of-state retailers. First,
this Part summarizes the Due Process Clause with respect to state taxa-
tion. Second, this Part provides background material on the relevant
13. This Comment uses the term "Digital Age" to refer generally to the last fifteen years of
the twentieth century to the date of publication of this Comment.
14. 303 P.3d 824 (N.M. 2013).
15. Id. at 829.
16. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (citing Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. For a further discussion on the distinction between the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause, see infra text accompanying notes 55-74.
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DCC case law. Finally, this Part demonstrates how different states and
courts have attempted to address the Internet retailer question.
A. The Due Process Clause and State Taxation
Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, no state
may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."20 At the heart of the Due Process Clause is the notion of funda-
mental fairness.2 1 A state should not tax an entity if there is insufficient
connection with the state because doing so would be unfair to the enti-
ty.22 As the U.S. Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence evolved, it
became evident that physical presence within a taxing state was neces-
sary for a state to constitutionally levy a tax.23 But in Quill, the Court
explained the evolution of its due process jurisprudence as a corollary to
24judicial jurisdiction. The Court further explained that it had expanded
the relevant judicial jurisdiction inquiry from what was once a strict
physical presence test to the "minimum contacts" test of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.25 Thus, the Court has favored a more flexible
due process inquiry.26 To illustrate, in Quill the Court made clear that the
Due Process Clause could be satisfied "irrespective of a corporation's
lack of physical presence in the taxing State.,27 Nevertheless, the tax
28may still be unconstitutional if it violates the Commerce Clause.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.",29 One purpose of the Commerce Clause is toprevent states from burdening interstate commerce.30  Although the
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
22. See id. (explaining that the touchstone of the due process fairness analysis is notice and
fair warning, and that the minimum contacts test isa proxy for notice).
23. Id. at 306.
24. Id. at 306-07.
25. Id. at 307 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In Internation-
al Shoe, the Court held that judicial jurisdiction extends to situations where a person has "certain
minimum contacts with [a state] such that the maintenance of [a] suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
26. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. For example, in "[a]pplying these principles [the Court has] held
that if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the
forum State, it may subject itself to the State's in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical
presence in the State." Id.
27. Id. at 308.
28. Seeid. at 312.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3-Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, § 2 (2009); see
also Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504
U.S. 298 (1992) ("The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free
from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Con-
gress alone has the power of regulation and control.").
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Commerce Clause specifically gives Congress the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce, it does not expressly limit state activity.31 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has construed the Commerce Clause also to
include its converse.32 That is, implied in the Commerce Clause is the so-
called "dormant Commerce Clause," which prohibits most state regula-
tions that discriminate against interstate commerce in the absence of
congressional action.33 Although states are permitted to regulate their
own intrastate commerce, a state regulation that adversely affects inter-
state commerce violates the DCC.34 A state regulation that incidentally
burdens commerce, however, is still valid if it is not designed to regulate
interstate commerce and is aimed instead at promoting a public policy
objective.35 In contrast, where a state has specific intent to discriminate
against other states, such facial discrimination is per se unconstitution-
al.36 Thus, the DCC is implicated in cases concerning state tax jurisdic-
tion over Internet retailers because it forbids states from interfering with
interstate commerce37 and most Internet retailers by their very nature are
involved in interstate commerce. The following Subpart summarizes the
relevant DCC case law of the last fifty years with respect to state taxation
of out-of-state retailers and provides a foundation for an analysis of In-
ternet tax issues.
1. Dormant Commerce Clause Case Law
A distinct line of U.S. Supreme Court cases involves the taxing
power of the states with respect to out-of-state retailers.38 Specifically,
these cases sought to address when a state goes too far in levying a tax
against out-of-state retailers under the DCC.39
In 1967, the Supreme Court announced a bright-line rule in Nation-
al Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.40 In Bellas Hess, the issue
was whether Illinois could constitutionally tax an out-of-state mail order
company that had no property or employees in the state.41 The Court held
that Illinois could not impose taxes on the out-of-state company, because
31. Buchwalter, supra note 30, § 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231-32 (1824) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring).
34. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 72-73 (majority opinion).
35. Id. (holding that state laws which have a legitimate object, such as public health, are not
unconstitutional if they "incidentally restrict or regulate" interstate commerce).
36. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978).
37. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
38. See id at 309; Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232
(1987); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't
of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
39. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
40. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-60; Daniel Tyler Cowan, Recent Development, New
York's Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxa-
tion & Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (2010).
41. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54.
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the company had no office, employees, solicitors, or property within the
42state. The Court further held that physical presence was a requirement
for taxation under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.43
In 1977, the Supreme Court expanded upon Bellas Hess's physical
presence rule.44 In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court once
again considered whether an out-of-state corporation could be required to
pay a state tax for activities conducted within the state.45 The Complete
Auto Court held that the state could tax the out-of state corporation.46 In
its holding, the Court announced a four-prong test extracted from prior
decisions.4 7 The Court declared that a tax does not violate the Commerce
Clause when it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.
' 48
The substantial nexus prong-the focus of this Comment and the cases
discussed below-stands for the proposition that retailers having an in-
sufficient or limited connection with a state cannot be taxed without of-
fending the DCC.49
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.
Washington State Department of Revenue, a consolidated case raising the
issue of whether Washington could constitutionally tax out-of-state man-
ufacturers whose products were sold in the state.50 The manufacturers did
not have any property, offices, or employees in Washington.51 But unlike
the business in Bellas Hess, which did not have any sales representatives
within the state, the out-of-state manufacturers had independent contrac-
tors in the taxing state who enabled them to establish and maintain a
market in Washington.52 The Court held that even though the companies
had no traditional employees or property in Washington, the independent
contractors' in-state activities established a nexus sufficient to permit the
state to tax the out-of-state manufacturers.53 In its reasoning, the Court
used the language of the Washington Supreme Court, which said that
42. Id. at 758-59. The Court also noted that where the only contacts with a state were by
means of common carrier or United States mail, there were not sufficient connections so as to permit
the state to tax the out-of-state company. Id. at 758.
43. Id. at 756-60.
44. See generally Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that a
substantial nexus is required for a state to tax a business).
45. Id. at 276.
46. See id. at 277-78, 289.
47. Id. at 279; Jon Gworek, Comment, The Imposition of Use Tax Collection Liability on
Mail-Order Retailers: What Happens When the Bellas Hess Barrier Is Removed?, 23 CONN. L. REV.
1087, 1108 (1991).
48. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. This Comment discusses the "substantial nexus" prong
of the Complete Auto test in-depth. The other three prongs are beyond the scope of this Comment.
49. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1992).
50. Id. at 234, 249.
51. Id.
52. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967), overruled by Quill,
504 U.S. 298.
53. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51 (1987).
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"the crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the
taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the
sales.,
54
i. The Physical Presence Test: Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota provides the current law regarding out-
of-state retailers and state tax jurisdiction. Before Quill there was signifi-
cant overlap between Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause issues
to the extent that it was sometimes difficult to distinguish the two in
court decisions.5 5 The Quill Court set out to clarify.56
Quill was similar to Bellas Hess in that it concerned a state tax
against an out-of-state corporation that sold office products and solicited
orders for its products through catalogs, advertisements, flyers, and tele-
phone calls.57 Quill had no significant property in North Dakota, nor did
it have any employees or representatives within the state.58 Like the
business in Bellas Hess, it sold its products through mail order to con-
sumers within the state.59 North Dakota imposed a use tax on Quill,
which it contested.60 The state sued and the trial court ruled for Quill.
61
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, rejected Bellas Hess's
bright-line physical presence rule with regard to the Commerce Clause
and reversed the lower court's decision.62 Instead, the court framed the
question in terms of the minimum contacts test of the Due Process
Clause63 and whether Quill had been provided any opportunities, bene-
fits, or protections from the taxing state.
64
Thus, the main issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether
North Dakota's tax violated the Due Process Clause or the Commerce
54. Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126 (Wash. 1986),
vacated, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06, 312 (1992) ("Despite the similarity in
phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical.").
56. See id. According to the Quill Court, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause
each represent distinctive constitutional concerns. Id. at 305. Due process mainly involves the fun-
damental fairness of government action. Id. at 312. For instance, due process requires that a person's
connections to a state be substantial enough to justify the state in exercising power over him. Id.
Conversely, the Commerce Clause is concerned with "structural ... effects of state regulation on the
national economy" so that state activity does not burden interstate commerce. Id. Consequently, the
inquiry into the validity of an exercise of state taxing power necessarily requires an independent
analysis of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. See Cowan, supra note 40, at 1430-
32.
57. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301.
58. Id. at 301-02.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 303.
62. Id. at 303-04.
63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
64. Quill, 504 U.S. at 304.
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Clause.65 With respect to whether the tax violated the Due Process
Clause, the Court held that the state could tax the out-of-state corpora-
tion, because Quill had "purposefully directed its activities at North Da-
kota residents."66 In expressly overruling past decisions that adhered to
the physical presence requirement, the Court reasoned that the evolution
of due process jurisprudence, particularly in the area of judicial jurisdic-
tion, mandated such a holding.67 In addition, the Court noted that there
was a sufficient link between the tax and the benefits Quill received from
access to the North Dakota market.
68
After deciding the due process issue, the Court turned to the Com-
merce Clause. The Court held that Quill did not have a substantial nexus
with the state because it had no offices or employees in North Dakota.
69
The Court rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court's ruling that if the
minimum contacts test of the Due Process Clause is satisfied, then the
substantial nexus test of the Commerce Clause is automatically 
met.70
Instead, the Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess's bright-line rule, and held that
to satisfy the DCC an entity must have physical presence within the tax-
ing state.7'
In summary, the Quill Court distinguished the requirements of the
72
Due Process Clause from those of the Commerce Clause. Due process
does not require physical presence if the minimum contacts test is satis-
fied.73 The Commerce Clause, however, does require physical presence
to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement.74
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Question of Internet Retail-
ers
Under the DCC, a business is exposed to a state's tax jurisdiction if
it has a substantial nexus with the state.75 A substantial nexus is estab-
lished through physical presence.76 However, the governing case-
Quill-was decided over twenty years ago;77 since then, the Internet has
65. See id at 301,305.
66. Id. at 308.
67. Id. ("[T]o the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires
physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those hold-
ings as superseded by developments in the law of due process."). For a discussion on the evolution
of judicial jurisdiction, see supra Part I.A.
68. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
69. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1424.
70. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305, 312-13, 318 (explaining that a corporation could have the mini-
mum contacts required under the Due Process Clause but still not meet the requirements of the
substantial nexus test under the Commerce Clause).
71. Patch, supra note 11, at 684-85.
72. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
73. Id. at 307-08.
74. Patch, supra note 11, at 684-85.
75. Quill, 504 U.S. at311.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 298.
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greatly changed the face of commerce. In response to the e-commerce
revolution, states have begun to experiment with their own Amazon tax-
es,79 which permit states to tax Internet retailers even if they are not
physically present within the state.0 The goal of these taxes81 is to close
the gap between state expenditures and revenue accrual.82 Another goal
is to level the playing field between brick-and-mortar and online busi-
nesses.83 It is very much an open question, however, whether Amazon
taxes are consistent with the Commerce Clause. Different courts have
come to different conclusions. Some courts have found a substantial
nexus through common ownership with an in-state business. Other courts
have found a substantial nexus solely through the economic presence of
the retailer in the taxing state. New York, for example, has attempted to
establish a substantial nexus through affiliate agreements with in-state
residents. In general, though, there is not a common methodology to deal
with taxation of Internet retailers. The following three Subparts show
how different states have attempted to establish a substantial nexus and
how the outcomes have been inconsistent in state and federal courts.
1. Establishing a Substantial Nexus Through Common Ownership
Some states have sought to establish a substantial nexus when an In-
ternet retailer and an in-state brick-and-mortar business have common
ownership. This Subpart discusses three cases that examined the com-
mon ownership method and the different analyses the courts employed.
In 1991, in SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon,84 the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that Connecticut could not tax a mail order compa-
ny, because common ownership and sharing a brand name with an in-
state affiliate did not create a sufficient nexus with the state.8 5 In its rea-
soning, the court expressly rejected an economic presence test, declaring
that the court was bound to Bellas Hess's bright-line rule that required
physical presence.
86
78. See Patch, supra note 11, at 699; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
79. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "Amazon tax" refers to any law or methodol-
ogy that seeks to bring an Internet retailer into a state's tax jurisdiction.
80. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1429; see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
81. This Comment is concerned primarily with sales, use, and gross receipts taxes. A sales tax
is "[a] tax imposed on the sale of goods and services." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed.
2009). It is synonymous with the term "retail tax." Id. A use tax is "[a] tax imposed on the use of
certain goods that are bought outside the taxing authority's jurisdiction." Id. A gross receipts tax is
"[a] tax on a business's gross receipts, without a deduction for costs of goods sold, or allowance for
expenses or deductions." Id. at 1595.
82. See Cowan, supra note 40, at 1423.
83. Brief for Respondents at 29-30, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation &
Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013) (No. 2013-0033).
84. 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991).
85. Id. at 668. SFA Folio Collections, Inc. was a mail order company that was affiliated with
Saks Fifth Avenue and shared the corporate name. Id.
86. Id. at 676.
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In more recent times, however, some courts have been willing to
adapt to the realities of e-commerce, while others have reached the same
conclusion as the SFA Folio court. In 2005, in Borders Online, LLC v.
State Board of Equalization,87 a California appeals court found that Bor-
ders Online was subject to a use tax because of its affiliation with Bor-
ders' stores in California.88 In 2007, a federal district court in Louisiana
considered St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com,
89
a factually similar case to Borders Online.9° The issue was whether
Barnesandnoble.com had a substantial nexus with Louisiana as a result
of in-state Barnes & Noble Booksellers (Booksellers) stores.9' The dis-
trict court evaluated the common use of the Barnes & Noble trademark,
the return policy, the loyalty program membership, and the gift cards
sold at brick-and-mortar Booksellers' locations that could be redeemed at
Barnesandnoble.com.92 In considering the shared activities, the court
held that there was not a substantial nexus between Barnesandnoble.com
and Louisiana.93 The court reasoned that Booksellers' activities within
the state were not sufficient to establish a market-based nexus.94 Unlike
the Borders Online court, which held that common ownership created a
substantial nexus, the St. Tammany Parish court relied on the absence of
an agency relationship in holding there was not state tax jurisdiction de-
spite the common ownership.
95
2. Establishing a Substantial Nexus Through Economic Presence
While some courts have looked to whether an out-of-state retailer
had a corporate relationship with an in-state affiliate, other courts have
considered the economic presence within a state by an outside vendor.
96
87. 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Ct. App. 2005).
88. Id. at 178. The Borders Online court found that the use of a shared logo and return policy
by both the Internet retailer and the in-state stores established a substantial nexus. See id. at 190.
Moreover, the court noted that cross-marketing strategies enabled Borders Online to establish and
maintain a market in California. Id. at 190-91. In reasoning that the Internet retailer benefited from
the in-state stores' activities, the court found that Borders Online effectively had a representative in
California, which created the requisite physical presence. Id. The court also explained that there was
a link on Borders' website which directed consumers to Borders Online's Internet address. Id. Fur-
ther, the two companies shared market and financial information. Id. Thus, according to the court,
both companies were actively promoting the Borders trademark. Id. at 192.
89. 481 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. La. 2007).
90. St. Tammany Parish is also factually similar to Barnesandnoble.com II, the focus of this
Comment. See infra Part 1I.
91. See St. Tammany Parish, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77.
92. Id. at 578.
93. Id. at 580. But see infra note 187.
94. See St. Tammany Parish, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 580. The court further reasoned that a com-
mon brand name and close corporate relationships did not impute physical presence to the Internet
retailer. Id. at 580-81. Although the two companies shared a parent company, Bamesandnoble.com
and Booksellers did not share managers or directors and were separate entities. Id. at 581. Finally,
the court noted that there was no evidence that he companies had shared assets. Id.
95. Id. at 582.
96. See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV.
157, 176-77 (2012); Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce Clause
in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX REV. 109, 112-13 (2004).
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The courts applying an economic presence test found that a state's tax
jurisdiction could be determined by an entity's economic presence in the
state, rather than by literal physical presence.97 Sales, property, or payroll
can make up economic presence.98 In addition, "deriving income from
licensing intangible property for use in the state is sufficient to establish
an economic nexus with the state."99 Again, different courts have come
to different conclusions. This Subpart analyzes how the economic pres-
ence test has been applied.
In 1990, in Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Bates,00 the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficient nexus for
Mississippi to tax an Alabama-based carpet seller who had no agents or
employees in Mississippi.10' The court reasoned that he state did not
have the authority to tax the carpet retailer even though the retailer sold
carpets to Mississippi residents, because the business did not conduct
activities within the state.102 In addition, the court noted that local Missis-
sippi carpet installers did not receive any compensation from the Ala-
bama-based retailer and were not agents or employees of the retailer.,
0 3
Furthermore, the court appeared to rely on the physical presence re-
quirement, because it based its decision on the lack of "underlying activi-
ties conducted within the state."'0 4
Comparatively, in 1993, in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,105 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a company
that had no physical presence within the state, but which licensed valua-
ble intellectual property, was subject to state taxation.0 6 The court rea-
soned that he company had received income from licensing intellectual
property for use in South Carolina.'0 7 The court also mentioned that reli-
ance on Bellas Hess's physical presence requirement was "misplaced"
and that any business which consistently exploited a state's market
should be subject to taxation.'0 8 The court reasoned that "[t]he presence
of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus."',
0 9
97. See Joondeph, supra note 96, at 112-13.
98. See id.
99. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 176. For further discussion on how economic presence
works, see infra Part IhI.D. 1.
100. 567 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1990).
101. Id. at 191,194.
102. Id. at 191, 193.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
106. Id. at 15 (noting that Geoffrey owned numerous trademarks and trade names, such as
"Toys R Us").
107. Id. at 18 ("[Tjhe taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state for income
to be taxable there."); Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 173.
108. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
109. Id. Additionally, the Geoffrey court dealt with Quill by reasoning that the physical pres-
ence requirement was limited to sales and use taxes. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 173. Starting in
2005, other state courts consistently rejected the physical presence requirement and moved towards
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In 2006, in Tax Commissioner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., °" 0 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals"' also rejected a physical pres-
ence requirement.1 2 The court stated that the test "makes little sense in
today's world."' 3 The court held that a bank's solicitation and mainte-
nance of state residents' credit cards created a "significant economic
presence" which met the substantial nexus requirement.14 The bank was
incorporated in Delaware and had no property or employees in West
Virginia." 1 5 Issuing and servicing credit cards was the primary business it
conducted in the state." 16 In order to attract customers, the bank promoted
its business through telephone solicitation and mail." 7 Under the "signif-
icant economic presence" test the court announced, a business has a sub-
stantial nexus with the state if it "purposefully directs its activities" at the
state and has exploited the state market." 8 In addition, the court noted
that technological advancements made Quill's physical presence re-
quirement obsolete." 1
9
3. Establishing a Substantial Nexus Through Affiliate Agreements:
The "Amazon Tax" Case
In addition to common ownership and economic presence, states
have sought to establish a substantial nexus through affiliate agreements
with third-party, in-state residents.'20 Under these Amazon taxes, Internet
retailers are required to collect taxes from consumers even if affiliates
are the only connection the retailers have with the state.121 The following
Subpart discusses a New York case involving two market-dominant In-
ternet retailers and affiliate agreements.
the economic presence standard. Id. at 174-76. However, these courts also distinguished Quill by
reasoning that Quill did not apply to other types of taxes apart from sales and use taxes, such as
income taxes. ld To date, the Supreme Court has declined to clarify whether Quill extends only to
use and sales taxes, or whether the physical presence requirement encompasses other taxes as well.
Id. at 159, 173-74.
110. 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006).
Ill. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is the state's highest court.
112. MBNA Am. Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 234.
113. Id.
114. Megan A. Stombock, Economic Nexus and Nonresident Corporate Taxpayers: How Far
Will It Go?, 61 TAX LAW. 1225, 1230 (2008).
115. MBNA Am. Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 227.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Stombock, supra note 114, at 1230.
119. Id. The MBNA court also distinguished between Quill and the current case by claiming
that Quill did not extend to the Business Activity Tax, the tax at issue in MBNA. Id.
120. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426, 1429.
121. See generally N.Y. TAX LAW § I 101 (b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2012) ("[A] person making
sales of tangible personal property or services... shall be presumed to be soliciting business through
an independent contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an agreement with a resi-
dent of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or
indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the
seller, if the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in the state who are
referred to the seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with the seller is in excess often
thousand dollars ....").
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In 2008, the Amazon tax made its debut in New York.122 Under the
New York law, Internet retailers such as Amazon.com or Over-
stock.com123 are presumed to be doing business within the state if they
enter into agreements with in-state affiliates or representatives.24 Inter-
net retailers are considered to be soliciting business within New York if
state residents obtain commissions or consideration from sales of tangi-
ble property by means of referral to the seller, even if through a website
or Internet link. 25 Thus, out-of-state Internet retailers are exposed to
New York's tax jurisdiction if they receive online referrals from in-state
affiliates that result in sales.1
26
Amazon.com (Amazon) is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Washington State.'27 It has no property or offices in
New York and its sole source of business is online retail through its web-
site.128 Likewise, Overstock.com (Overstock) is a Delaware corporation
whose principal place of business is in Utah and does not have any prop-
erty, offices, or employees in New York.129 Both Amazon and Overstock
(collectively, Online Retailers) have affiliate programs whereby third
parties agree to place links on their own websites that direct consumers
to the Online Retailer's site.'30 If the consumer buys merchandise after
being redirected from an affiliate's website to the Online Retailer's web-
site, both Amazon and Overstock pay the third party a commission.
13
The affiliate contracts between the third parties and the Online Retailers
designate the affiliates as "independent contractors."'
' 32
In 2008, Amazon and Overstock sued the New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance in response to the state's tax law amend-
ments that created the Amazon Tax.133 Both companies argued that the
statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause.' 
34
122. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426, 1429.
123. Amazon.corn and Overstock.com conduct their retail business entirely through Internet
sales and do not have any brick-and-mortar retail stores.
124. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426.
125. Id.
126. Rob Owen, Recent Development, The "Amazon Tax" Issue: Washing away the Require-
ment of Physical Presence for Sales Tax Jurisdiction over Internet Businesses, 2013 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 231, 233.
127. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y.
2013).
128. Id.




133. Id. at 624.
134. See id. The due process question concerning the statutory presumption is beyond the
scope of this Comment. The issue was whether the rebuttable civil presumption, which presumed
that a retailer was doing business in the state if independent contractors received commissions from
sales stemming from solicitation in the state, violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 623.
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The New York Court of Appeals'35 addressed the question of wheth-
er the statute violated the DCC's substantial nexus test.'36 On March 28,
2013, the court upheld New York's tax law because the affiliate agree-
ments created a substantial nexus with the state.1 37 According to the
court, the affiliation agreements with New York residents amounted to
active advertisement by the Online Retailers.38 The court reasoned that
if a retailer pays a resident to solicit local business, the retailer should be
subject to the state's tax law.'39 Furthermore, the court held that the Am-
azon tax did not violate the Due Process Clause.40 The court explained
that the Online Retailers had "purposefully directed" their activities in
New York and therefore had notice that they could be subjected to state
14 1 42taxes.  Accordingly, the Amazon Tax was constitutional .
Following the unfavorable New York ruling, Amazon and Overstock
separately filed writs of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.143 In its
petition, Amazon emphasized that the affiliate program, labeled the "As-
sociates Program," is merely a marketing tool and that affiliates place
"passive advertisements on their websites" which can link to Amazon's
website.144 According to Amazon, the New York court contravened Bel-
las Hess's physical-presence rule. 45 Amazon also claimed that the court
disregarded the rule from Quill, which held that advertisement by itself
does not establish a substantial nexus. 146 Similarly, Overstock argued that
the activities of the in-state, third-party affiliates did not impute a physi-
cal presence within the state because they were not agents of the compa-
ny.147 Overstock focused on the lack of an agency relationship with the
third-party affiliates and argued that economic presence does not assign
135. The New York Court of Appeals is the state's highest court.
136. Overstock.con, 987 N.E.2d at 625.




141. See id. ("[An entity 'that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business
within a State ... clearly has fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of [the
state],' even in the absence of physical presence." (second and third alterations in original) (omission
in original) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992))).
142. Id. at 627.
143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin.,
2013 WL 4508624 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Over-
stock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 2013 WL 4495978 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2013)
(No. 13-252).
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *3, Amazon.com, 2013 WL 4508624 (No. 13-259).
145. See id. at *8.
146. See id. A more precise reading of Quill, however, shows that the Court was more con-
cerned with companies whose advertisements through a common carrier, such as through mail, were
the only connection the company had with the state. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. The Court stated that
there is a "sharp distinction" between companies that advertise but have no physical presence and
those that advertise and have some physical presence. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *20-21, Overstock.com, 2013 WL 4495978 (No. 13-
252).
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physical presence.148 On December 2, 2013, the Court denied certiorari
without offering any commentary. 1
49
II. NEW MEXICO TAXATION & REVENUE DEPARTMENT V.
BARNESANDNOBLE.COM LLC
New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department v. Barnesandno-
ble.com LLC (Barnesandnoble.com I1)150 is a common ownership case.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in favor of
the state, framed the issue around the DCC and analyzed Quill's physical
presence requirement. While the court did not explicitly mention an eco-
nomic presence test, it considered whether an in-state sister corporation's
activities allowed the Internet retailer to maintain and exploit a market in
New Mexico.15' The New Mexico Supreme Court's analysis, therefore, is
tantamount to an economic presence test. This case is a recent and quin-
tessential example of how courts have injected their own reasoning in
light of the outdated Quill test.
A. Facts
Barnesandnoble.com (bn.com) does not have a physical presence in
New Mexico.152 It has no property or employees in the state.153 Incorpo-
rated in Delaware, bn.com is an out-of-state Internet retailer that sells
books, media, and other products through its website.154 Bn.com was a
wholly owned subsidiary of bames&noble.com, inc. during the time at
issue, and at least forty percent of the ownership of barnes&noble.com,
inc. had been owned by B&N.com Holding Corp.155 The parent corpora-
tion, Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Parent) had an interest in bn.com because
B&N.com Holding Corp. was a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.'56
Further, Parent owned Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. (Booksellers),
which currently has three retail stores in New Mexico. 
57
In addition to the common ownership, there is significant business
interrelationship between the two companies. Bn.com and Booksellers
sell Barnes & Noble gift cards that can be redeemed online or in a
store.58 On the back of the gift card is bn.com's website address. 5 9 Both
148. Id. at 21-24.
149. Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013); Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987
N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013).
150. The case is referred to as Barnesandnoble.com II to distinguish it from the lower court
case.
151. Barnesandnoble.com 11, 303 P.3d 824, 825 (N.M. 2013).
152. Id.
153. In re Bamesandnoble.com LLC (Barnesandnoble.com 1), 283 P.3d 298, 300 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2012).
154. Barnesandnoble.com I1, 303 P.3d at 825-26.
155. Barnesandnoble.com 1, 283 P.3d at 300-01.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 301.
158. Id.
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bn.com and Booksellers sell loyalty program memberships that give
members online and in-store discounts.16° The membership fees go to
Parent, bn.com, and Booksellers.'61 In addition, return policies, which are
reciprocated by bn.com and Booksellers, allow customers to return items
bought online at bn.com to Booksellers' retail stores.'62 Finally, bn.com's
website informs customers of Booksellers' store locations.
63
In 2006, the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (Rev-
enue Department) audited bn.com and assessed a gross receipts tax
against the Internet retailer for a seven-year period from 1998 through
2005 for its sales to New Mexico customers.164 The Revenue Department
conducted the assessment under the authority of the Gross Receipts and
Compensating Tax Act.' 
65
B. Procedural History
Bn.com contested the gross receipts tax, claiming that it violated the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'66 A state hearing officer
granted summary judgment to bn.com, finding that it was unconstitution-
al to tax the Internet retailer.'67 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed,
finding that bn.com did have a substantial nexus with New Mexico as
required by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'68 The ap-
peals court relied heavily on Tyler Pipe, in which the Supreme Court
held that physical presence can be created through the establishment and
maintenance of a market.'69 As a result, the court reasoned that bn.com's
affiliation with Barnes & Noble stores through cross-marketing activities
and the shared use of trademarks created a substantial nexus.17 Bn.competitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.'7 1
C. Opinion
In 2013, New Mexico's highest court unanimously affirmed the ap-






164. Gail O'Gradney, Taxation of Online Retailer Did Not Run Afoul of Commerce Clause, 31
No. 7 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISOR 6 (2013).
165. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-1 to -114 (2012).
166. Barnesandnoble.com 1, 283 P.3d at 301. See generally Joondeph, supra note 96, at 120
(explaining that the Due Process Clause places limits on the states' taxing powers by prohibiting
states from taxing interstate activities if there is not a minimal connection between the state and the
interstate activities).
167. Barnesandnoble.com 11, 303 P.3d 824, 825-26 (N.M. 2013).
168. Id.; Barnesandnoble.com 1, 283 P.3d at 300. The appeals court declined to address the due
process claim, saying that it had no merit. Id at 307.
169. Barnesandnoble.com I, 283 P.3d at 302.
170. Barnesandnoble.com I1, 303 P.3d at 825-26.
171. Id.
172. Id
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Revenue Department could impose New Mexico gross receipts tax on
bn.com without violating the Commerce Clause, even though bn.com
had no physical presence in the state.I7 3 The court held that the state may
do so without violating the Commerce Clause because there was a sub-
stantial nexus between bn.com and the state.
174
The New Mexico Supreme Court framed the issue around the DCC
and the substantial nexus test.1 75 Analyzing the Supreme Court's decision
in Quill, the court said that "[t]he Commerce Clause has been interpreted
not only as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, but also as a limi-
tation on state actions that interfere with interstate commerce.'7 6 In re-
ferring to the part of Commerce Clause doctrine known as the negative
or dormant clause, the court said that the DCC is offended when inter-
state commerce is burdened by state taxation.177 Under the Complete
Auto test, however, states are allowed to tax parties involved in interstate
commerce without federal authorization if there is a substantial nexus
between the state and the party's activities within the state.78 According
to the court, therefore, the only question presented was whether bn.com's
online sales to New Mexico customers had a substantial nexus with the
state. 179
Having clarified the issue to be decided, the court turned to whether
the DCC had been violated.1 80 After evaluating Supreme Court prece-
dent, the New Mexico court determined that absence of physical pres-
ence was not dispositive.181 The court reasoned that the "Supreme Court
has consistently taken a functional approach to the substantial nexus
analysis. ' 82 Therefore, the court refrained the issue as "whether
173. Id. at 825.
174. Id
175. See id. at 826; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States").
176. Barnesandnoble.com 11, 303 P.3d at 826 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 309 (1992)).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 826-27. The court compared Quill, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that North
Dakota could not constitutionally tax a mail order company with no property or employees within
the state, with Tyler Pipe. Id. In the latter case, the Court held that even where a vendor had no
employees or property within a state, in-state activity could establish a sufficient nexus. Id.; see also
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) ("[T]he crucial
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for
the sales." (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126 (Wash. 1986),
vacated, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also referred to Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, a 1960 U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a business that had no
property or full-time employees in Florida could nonetheless be exposed to the state's tax jurisdic-
tion. Barnesandnoble.com II, 303 P.3d at 826-27 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 208-
09, 211 (1960)). The Court had reasoned that contractors had solicited business within Florida on the
company's behalf. Id.
181. See Barnesandnoble.com 11,303 P.3d at 826-27.
182. Id.
[Vol. 9 1:3
2014] NEW MEXICO TAXATION V. BARNESANDNOBLE.COM 759
Booksellers performed activities on behalf of bn.com [which were] sig-
nificantly associated with bn.com's ability to establish and maintain a
market for its sales in New Mexico."'
8 3
The court then addressed Booksellers' activities in New Mexico that
were associated with bn.com.184 The court held that Bookseller per-
formed activities in the state that "were significantly associated with
bn.com's ability to establish and maintain a market" in New Mexico.1
85
The court reasoned that a substantial nexus existed because of the sale of
gift cards at Booksellers that displayed bn.com's web address, the loyalty
program membership sold by both companies, and the return policy that
enabled customers to return items bought at bn.com to Booksellers' loca-
tions in New Mexico.' 86 Further, the court noted that bn.com and
Booksellers shared their patrons' email addresses with each other, both
companies used the Barnes & Noble trademark, and as a result, bn.com
benefitted from consumer brand loyalty established at Booksellers'
stores.187 Accordingly, the court concluded that Booksellers' in-state
activities, including the use of the shared trademark, helped bn.com "es-
tablish and maintain a market" in New Mexico.' 88 Therefore, the Court
held that the Commerce Clause did not prevent the Revenue Department
from collecting gross receipts tax from bn.com, because the company
had a substantial nexus with the state.' 
8 9
III. ANALYSIS
In Barnesandnoble.com II, the New Mexico Supreme Court ex-
plored the controversial issue of whether Internet retailers could be sub-
jected to state sales taxes by virtue of affiliations with in-state entities
without violating the DCC' 90 In this case, direct affiliation through
common use of trademarks and business policies established enough of a
nexus to allow New Mexico to impose a gross receipts tax. '9 In its dis-
183. Id. at 827.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 829.
186. See id. at 827.
187. Id. at 827-28. In its discussion, the court also considered the Borders Online, SFA Folio,
and St. Tammany Parish cases. Id. at 828-29. In doing so, the court noted the divergent viewpoints
and holdings. Id. at 829. In particular, the court mentioned that St. Tammany Parish was nearly
identical to Barnesandnoble.com II, yet had come out differently. Id. at 829. The New Mexico
Supreme Court then claimed that the district court in St. Tammany Parish had erroneously applied a
higher standard than Tyler Pipe demanded. Id. According to the New Mexico court, Tyler Pipe
required that the activities performed on behalf of the business be "significantly associated with
[bn.com's] ability to establish and maintain a market." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tyler Pipe
Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The St. Tammany Parish court, however, had read that requirement o mean that a suffi-
cient nexus occurred only when another entity was acting as an agent of the out-of-state retailer. Id.
188. Id. at 829.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 826-28. In relying on Quill, the court held that the physical presence of an in-state
sister corporation satisfied the requirements of the DCC. Id. at 826, 829.
191. See id. at 827-28.
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cussion, the court identified Quill as providing the governing law, but
looked beyond the literal meaning of the physical presence require-
ment,'92 recognizing that strict adherence to Quill was impracticable in
an e-commerce world. In fact, the court adeptly employed an economic
nexus-type analysis, under the guise of the physical presence test.
93
Thus, according to the court, when an entity is able to "establish and
maintain a market" in a state, even in the absence of in-state employees
or property, there is state tax jurisdiction, because the business's pres-
ence within the state creates a substantial nexus.'94 This reasoning is
more in line with an economic presence analysis, in which economic
exploitation is comparable to physical exploitation.
95
With the backdrop of the Barnesandnoble.com H decision as a
guidepost, this Part first contends that the U.S. Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to weigh in on the precise standard courts should use when
determining substantial nexus when it denied certiorari of the recent New
York case. As demonstrated in Part I.B., courts have applied varying
standards and the outcomes have been unreliable; therefore, the Court
should have alleviated the uncertainty with respect to the DCC and Inter-
net retailers by setting a clear standard that comports with modem day
realities. Next, this Part argues that the Quill decision is irrelevant in the
Digital Age. In addition, this Part contends that Bellas Hess's bright-line
physical presence rule and Quill's affirmation of that rule should be
overruled. Moreover, this Part discusses congressional attempts to over-
rule the physical presence requirement and the Marketplace Fairness Act
of 2013. Finally, after having established the problem with the current
state of the law, this Part recommends a solution: the Court should adopt
the economic presence standard because it is more viable in the Digital
Age. Further, in arguing for adoption of an economic presence standard,
this Part concludes by suggesting that the New Mexico Supreme Court's
holding in Barnesandnoble.com H provides a practical approach to Inter-
net retailer taxation cases.
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Weighed in: Amazon and Overstock
The U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to address Internet re-
tailer taxation in a pair of high-profile cases that made their way to
Washington.196 On August 22, 2013, Overstock petitioned the Court for a
writ of certiorari following the New York Court of Appeal's ruling,
192. See id. at 826-27. The court noted that bn.com did not have any property or employees in
the state but asserted that there could nonetheless still be a substantial nexus. Id. at 826-27.
193. See generally id. at 829 (holding that a substantial nexus existed because the in-state sister
corporation had enabled bn.com to "establish and maintain a market" in New Mexico).
194. Id. at 826-27, 829.
195. See Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 195.
196. See supra Part I.C.3..
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which held that affiliate agreements created a substantial nexus.197 The
next day, Amazon followed with its own petition. 198 The cases concerned
the constitutionality of New York's Amazon Tax.' 
99
The Court, however, has left many questions unanswered. On De-
cember 2, 2013, the Court denied the writs of certiorari without offering
any commentary.200 The Court should have taken the opportunity to up-
date its DCC jurisprudence in light of the changing nature of interstate
commerce.
As noted in Part I.B., different courts have come to different con-
clusions, and the Court's failure to settle the matter leaves the nation in a
continued state of uncertainty. For example, some courts have held that
common ownership with an in-state sister corporation establishes a sub-
stantial nexus with the state.20 1 Like the Barnesandnoble.com Ii court,
these courts have reasoned that the DCC is not offended if the Internet
202
retailer "establish[es] and maintain[s] a market" in the taxing state.
However, not all courts have reached similar conclusions under almost
203
indistinguishable factual scenarios. For instance, in St. Tammany Par-
ish, a federal district court held that shared marketing activities between
Booksellers and bn.com did not create a substantial nexus despite the
factual similarities to Barnesandnoble.com H.2°4 Still other courts have
guessed as to the applicability of Quill in employing an economic pres-
ence test.2°5 Again, courts considering the economic presence test have
come out differently.20 6 And finally, the Amazon and Overstock cases
represent yet another methodology used by states to subject Internet re-
tailers to state tax jurisdiction-affiliate agreements with third-party, in-
state residents.20 7
197. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation &
Fin., 2013 WL 4495978 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2013) (No. 13-252).
198. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin.,
2013 WL 4508624 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259).
199. Greg Bensinger, Amazon Asks Supreme Court to Decide Sales Tax Fight, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 28, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/08/28/amazon-asks-supreme-court-to-decide-sales-
tax-fight/.
200. Amazon.corn LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013); Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987
N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013).
201. See, e.g., Borders Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 192 (Ct.
App. 2005).
202. See Barnesandnoble.com II, 303 P.3d 824, 829 (N.M. 2013).
203. See St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com, 481 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580
(E.D. La. 2007).
204. Id.
205. See Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 173-76; see also discussion supra Part I.B. .
206. Compare Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18-19 (S.C. 1993) (holding
that a company which had no physical presence within the state, but which licensed valuable intel-
lectual property for use within the state, was subject to state taxation), with Miss. State Tax Comm'n
v. Bates, 567 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1990) (holding that there was not a nexus sufficient for Mississippi
to tax an Alabama-based carpet seller who had no agents or employees in Mississippi).
207. See Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426; see also supra Part I.C.3.
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Thus, there are three ways courts have analyzed state taxation of
out-of-state retailers: (1) establishment of a substantial nexus through
common ownership, (2) establishment of a substantial nexus through
economic presence, and (3) establishment of a substantial nexus through
affiliate agreements.208 As is demonstrated by these different methods of
analysis, there is no one standard courts can look to in determining
whether an Internet retailer has a substantial nexus with a state such that
it can be exposed to taxation without offending the DCC.
The Court had the opportunity to address the Internet retailer issue
and establish unambiguous rules for state taxation of e-commerce. In-
stead, the Court chose to deny certiorari in the Amazon and Overstock
case. As a result, states are employing various and inconsistent standards
to obtain tax jurisdiction. In the absence of clear direction from the
Court, interstate commerce will remain in a continued state of flux with
respect to taxation and Internet retailers.209 For instance, state legislators
may pass similar Amazon taxes in the wake of the New York ruling,210 in
which the New York court held that the state's tax law did not violate the
Commerce Clause because affiliate agreements created a substantial
nexus with the state.21 The Court should have at the very least set guide-
lines and rules for state taxation of e-commerce.212 The absence of such
guidance has left a void in which courts have applied varying and some-
times incompatible interpretations of the DCC in Internet retailer cas-
213es.
The impact on small businesses engaged in e-commerce is also pal-
pable. Because unambiguous rules concerning state taxation facilitate
settled expectations and encourage individuals and business owners to
invest,214 a clear rule is needed. The Court's lack of direction will proba-
bly encourage other states to implement their own Amazon taxes.
21 5
Consequently, businesses will be compelled to update their infrastructure
and incur compliance costs in order to conform to state laws.216 For ex-
ample, businesses will need to upgrade their accounting software and
take-on licensing and maintenance costs.2 17 These changes will dispro-
portionately affect small businesses.2 18 The Court's decision to deny re-
208. See supra Part I.C.
209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *33, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation
& Fin., 2013 WL 4495978 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2013) (No. 13-252).
210. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *24-25, Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxa-
tion & Fin., 2013 WL 4508624 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259).
211. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 626 (N.Y.
2013).
212. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *26, Amazon.com, 2013 WL 4508624 (No. 13-259).
213. See discussion supra Part I.C.
214. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
215. Brief for Scrapbook.corn, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Over-
stock.com, 987 N.E.2d 621 (Nos. 13-252, 13-259).
216. See id.
217. Id. at 2-3.
218. Id. at 2.
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view creates more ambiguity in an already uncertain climate.219 If busi-
nesses cannot be sure about the scope of state tax jurisdiction, they can-
not effectively plan their compliance costs.220 The legal uncertainty will
only lead to a chill on investments and a downturn in economic
growth.2 2'
In addition, the New York court's decision raises questions about
the continued relevance of Quill's substantial nexus rule222 because states
are continuously looking for a way to maneuver around the physical
presence requirement. Therefore, the Court should have taken the oppor-
tunity to set a clear standard.
B. Quill Is Not Relevant in an E-Commerce World
Quill's utility is limited in the modem era of e-commerce. Yet Quill
remains the governing law regarding out-of-state retailers and state taxa-
tion, despite that it was decided more than twenty years ago.223 Since the
1992 Quill decision, commerce has changed drastically and Quill's phys-
224
ical presence test is largely outdated. As the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated, "An entity may now have a profound impact upon a foreign
jurisdiction solely through its virtual projection via the Internet.,225 Con-
sequently, an overhaul of DCC jurisprudence is needed in order to recon-
cile retailers' interests in uniform tax collection rules with the states'
interest in closing the gap between expenditures and revenue.226
The physical presence test, announced in 1967 and then reaffirmed
in 1992, does not take into account modern-day realities.227 Indeed, when
the rule was first articulated, physical presence was generally required
for a retailer to enter a state's market.228 For instance, to generate mean-
ingful business in a state, retailers would have once needed employees,
2 230
warehouses, or offices within the state. 29 This is not the reality today.
Communication technology has proliferated to the extent that it is possi-
ble, and likely, that a retailer will establish and maintain a market with-
out a physical presence.23 1 Therefore, any retailer that consistently ex-
ploits a state's market, such as through cross-marketing strategies with
219. Seeid. at3.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 15.
222. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1444.
223. David H. Gershel, Comment, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable Application of State
Sales Tax to Electronic Commerce, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 335, 339 (2011).
224. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y.
2013).
225. Id.
226. Patch, supra note 11, at 694-95.
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in-state sister corporations or with third-party affiliate agreements,
should be exposed to state tax jurisdiction.2
Not everyone recognizes the impact of technological advance-
ments.233 In his dissent in the Amazon and Overstock case, Justice Smith
failed to consider the far-reaching changes e-commerce has brought, and
wrongly contends that a website owner who is "trying to persuade mem-
7 234bers of the public" is not equivalent to a sales agent. Justice Smith
attempted to bolster his argument by claiming that a traditional salesman,
who seeks to promote a specific product so that he will get a commis-
sion, is not comparable to a website owner that promotes an Internet re-
tailer's products.235 Instead, he argued "no website owner promotes
Overstock or Amazon for a similar reason [as a traditional salesman
does], because everyone who wants to buy from either of those firms can
go to the retailer's website directly.2 36 But this view is mistaken, partic-
ularly in the age of e-commerce where the pace of commerce has in-
creased exponentially to where transactions occur by a simple click of a
button.
For example, consider a small business owner engaged in the lawn
mower industry who repairs broken lawn mowers and who sells lawn
mower components. Next, assume the company does not actually sell
lawn mowers. It may, however, advertise on its website for the particular
kinds of lawn mowers it services and sells parts for. In this respect, it is
in the small business owner's interest to solicit business for an Internet
retailer that sells lawn mowers. The more people in the locality that own
a particular brand of lawn mower, the more business the company will
see through repairs and sales of component parts. The same reasoning
holds true for a small business that sells the primary product but does not
sell the components. In other words, contrary to Justice Smith's argu-
ment, people may not always go directly to an Internet retailer's website
to buy a certain product and it is advantageous to the small business
owner and the Internet retailer to engage in such mutually beneficial so-
licitation tactics. As demonstrated above, the Internet has completely
changed the face of commerce. It is high time to recognize that what
232. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
233. This is especially true for out-of-touch judges well into their life tenures. See generally
Joseph Goldstein, Life Tenure for Federal Judges Raises Issues of Senility, Dementia, PROPUBLICA
(Jan. 18, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/life-tenure-for-federal-judges-raises-
issues-of-senility-dementia (describing an eighty-four year old judge that needed to have email
explained to him and a 2010 study that found that approximately twelve percent of federal judges are
over eighty years old).
234. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y.
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constitutes a substantial nexus in 2014 is very different from what consti-
tuted a substantial nexus in 1992.237
As the facts of recent legal disputes make clear, the physical pres-
ence requirement is arbitrary and anachronistic in an age where physical
boundaries have little to no import.238 For instance, the foundation of the
physical presence requirement is the fundamental prohibition against
extraterritorial taxation.239 The ban on extraterritorial taxes is a basic
limit on state authority, which the nation's highest court has recognized
since the mid-1800s.240 This reflects the principle that states are generally
limited to taxing those activities which occur within state borders.241 But
traditional notions of state boundaries and borders have changed dramat-
ically in the Digital Age. Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the
evolving nature of the national landscape in the pioneering case, McCul-
loch v. Maryland.242 In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall explained that
it was "impossible for [the framers] to foresee the infinite variety of cir-
cumstances ... [that would impact this] society [of] ours [because it is]
for ever changing and for ever improving."243 Stated differently, there is
room for adaptability in the nation's jurisprudence.
When Quill was decided, the emergence of individual Internet us-
244
age was just beginning. In fact, in 1992, the same year the Quill Court
came down with its decision, Congress first permitted the government,
including the military, to use the Internet.245 It was not until 1994 that
people began to use the Internet for business.246 Fast-forward twenty
years: The Internet has revolutionized commerce and emergent technolo-
gies have transformed state economies.24 7 For instance, in 2005, the U.S
Census Bureau reported that the total adjusted amount of e-commerce
retail sales was $90.1 billion. 24' But in the first quarter of 2014 alone, e-
commerce accounted for $71.2 billion of total retail sales and are on pace
to reach $285 billion by the end of the year.249 And according to the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, the states missed an estimated
$23.3 billion in revenue in 2012 because they were not allowed to collect
237. See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (discussing the DCC
and the substantial nexus requirement in the context of mail order businesses).
238. See Joondeph, supra note 96, at 112.
239. Id. at 122.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 122-23.
242. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 384-85 (1819) (holding that the states
have no power to tax or burden a national bank created by Congress and establishing that Congress
has implied powers apart from those enumerated in the Constitution).
243. Id. at 385.
244. See Patch, supra note I1, at 675-76.
245. Id. at 675.
246. Id. at 676.
247. See id. at 699.
248. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: I Quarter
2014 (May 15, 2014), available at https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec urrent.pdf.
249. Id.
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and remit sales and use taxes from Internet retailers.250 The current tax
scheme makes little sense in an e-commerce world, because sales and use
taxes are central to the states' fiscal health.2 5' As it is, states already face
budget shortfalls.
252
In conclusion, Quill's substantial nexus test, which requires physi-
cal presence in the taxing state,253 has lost relevance in our Internet and
technology driven society.25 4 The change to a service-based economy
from a mercantile economy, together with the increased mobility of capi-
tal, further shows that Quill is outdated because companies can conduct
their in-state business from almost anywhere.5 Geography and physical
presence do not have the significance they had when Quill was decid-
ed.256 As a consequence of the antiquated rule, Internet retailers have
been able to evade taxes. 7 Furthermore, Internet retailers have used the
current tax rules in order to create price advantages over their brick-and-
mortar counterparts who are required to collect state taxes.258 Requiring
Internet retailers to collect state taxes does nothing more than oblige
those retailers to collect what other vendors that do business within a
state already have to do.259 Therefore, continued adherence to Quill's
physical presence rule fails to reflect the realities of doing business in the
Digital Age.
C. Bellas Hess and Quill Stare Decisis Should Be Overruled
The majority's holding in Quill was illogical.260 In his dissenting
opinion, Justice White explained that affirmation of Bellas Hess's bright-
line physical presence rule would create perverse results.26' For example,
an out-of-state retailer with just one in-state employee could be brought
into a state's tax jurisdiction, even if the employee's activities were unre-
lated to sales within the state. 262 Meanwhile, an out-of-state retailer that
is the dominant retailer in a state could "creat[e] ... infrastructure bur-
dens and undercut[] the State's home companies by its comparative price
advantage in selling products free of use taxes.'263 Nevertheless, the out-
250. Jessica Nicole Cory, The Gap Created by E-Commerce: How States Can Preserve Their
Sales and Use Tax Revenue in the Digital Age, 8 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 57 (2012).
251. Joondeph, supra note 96, at I 10.
252. Gershel, supra note 223, at 335-36.
253. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1424.
254. See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspec-
tive, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321 (2003).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 344.
257. See Cory, supra note 250.
258. Id.
259. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 29-30.
260. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
261. Id. at 328-29.
262. Id. at 328.
263. Id. at 328-29.
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of-state retailer would be immune from the state's tax jurisdiction under
the physical presence rule.264 According to Justice White, "[t]he majority
clings to the physical-presence rule not because of any logical relation to
fairness or any economic rationale related to principles underlying the
Commerce Clause, but simply out of the supposed convenience of hav-
ing a bright-line rule. 265 This, he says, is illogical, and disagrees with the
266majority's ruling that is based on stare decisis grounds. The Court
should have instead given the physical presence rule the "complete buri-
al" it deserved.267
Because the Quill Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess's bright-line physi-
cal presence rule primarily under stare decisis grounds,268 and the reasons
for doing so no longer exist today, the Supreme Court should have over-
ruled Quill. 269 The social, technological, and economic changes of the
Digital Age demonstrate that strict adherence to a physical presence
standard is no longer relevant.270 Further, the old rule is proving unwork-
able because states are losing out on vast amounts of revenue as a result
of the Quill standard.271 Therefore, the Court should have discarded a
literal interpretation of Quill's physical presence standard; particularly in
light of the dramatic changes that e-commerce brings to the digital mar-
ketplace. Therefore, it makes sense to interpret physical presence broadly
so that Internet retailers are subject to a state's tax jurisdiction when they
have affiliate agreements with state residents or share common owner-
ship with in-state brick-and-mortar businesses.
In holding that the physical presence test continues to control, the
Quill Court dedicated much of its opinion to the benefits of stare deci-
sis.272 In fact, three concurring Justices adhered to Bellas Hess's bright-
line rule solely on stare decisis principles.273 The majority opinion, how-
ever, admitted that the Bellas Hess rule was "artificial at its edges.274 In
recognizing that the physical presence rule was artificial, the Court stated
that the benefit of an unambiguous rule outweighs its artificiality. 275 The
Court reasoned that the physical presence rule established clear bounda-
264. Id.
265. Id. at 329.
266. See id. at 317-19 (majority opinion); id. at 328-29 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
267. Id. at 322 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White was referring
to the Quill Court's overturning of the physical presence requirement of the Due Process Clause and
its affirmation of the physical presence requirement under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 321-22.
268. See Swain, supra note 254, at 329, 331 (noting that many commentators view stare decisis
as the crux of the Quill decision).
269. See generally id. at 332 (defining stare decisis as "a bedrock principle of law" which
"provides that courts will adhere to existing precedent and not disturb settled points").
270. See discussion supra Part Il.B.
271. See Cory, supra note 250; see also supra text accompanying notes 250-52.
272. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-17 (majority opinion).
273. Swain, supra note 254, at 330.
274. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
275. Id.
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ries for state tax jurisdiction and in doing so decreased litigation potential
regarding sales and use taxes.276 But the Court has not always been reluc-
tant to turn away from stare decisis:
[It] has identified four factors that it considers [when overruling ex-
isting precedent]: (1) whether there has been significant change in re-
lated principles of law; (2) whether there has been a change in the
factual milieu (social, economic, cultural, technological, and so on);
(3) whether the old rule has become unworkable; and (4) whether
there are strong reliance interests in the old rule that would be
harmed by a change.
277
In Quill, the Court looked to the reliance interest factor in finding that
individuals and businesses seeking to invest would benefit from the
bright-line rule.278 But any basis that existed for the holding in 1992 is
not applicable in 2014, because the rationale for the physical presence
standard has been displaced by modern developments.279 In fact, the
Court could have very well overturned the physical presence r quirement
based on factors one to three if it had granted certiorari in the Amazon
and Overstock case. Furthermore, the Quill Court's affirmation of Bellas
Hess's bright-line physical presence standard on stare decisis grounds
was weak.280 By openly admitting the artificiality of the rule, the Court
essentially acknowledged that the physical presence standard had vulner-
2811abilities.
In addition, in affirming the bright-line rule, the Quill Court validat-
ed Bellas Hess's reasoning, which was based largely on administrative
concerns.282 The Bellas Hess Court had reasoned that "[t]he many varia-
tions in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and
record-keeping requirements could entangle [the company's] interstate
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdic-
tions. 283 Thus, at the core of the Court's holding was the concern that
imposing state tax jurisdiction based on anything other than physical
presence could ensnare the national economy with local issues, which
284was the very thing the Commerce Clause was designed to avoid. The
Bellas Hess Court, however, then asserted that it was within the domain
of Congress to settle such matters.285 The Quill Court repeated that sen-
276. Seeid. at 315-16.
277. Swain, supra note 254, at 332.
278. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 316.
279. See id. at 327-28 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra Part
III.B.
280. Alexander Smith, Quill by Affiliation, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 755, 761 (2012).
281. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (majority opinion).
282. See generally Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967),
overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08, 315-16 (1992) (establishing that
the bright-line rule would provide for ease of tax administration).
283. Id. (footnotes omitted).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 60.
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timent saying that "the underlying issue is... one that Congress may be
better qualified to resolve ... [and] one that Congress has the ultimate
power to resolve.286
But Congress has already attempted to resolve the issue with a law
that explicitly does not bar states from collecting taxes from Internet
retailers and with legislation aimed at bringing Internet retailers within
the scope of state tax jurisdiction. The Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998
(ITFA)287 placed a moratorium on taxing specific Internet transactions.
288
The ITFA prohibits states from taxing access to the Internet.289 It also
prevents states from placing multiple or discriminatory taxes on e-
commerce. 29  In other words, the ITFA did not address sales and use
taxes themselves.29' Rather, it barred states from taxing online consumers
differently than consumers that shop in brick-and-mortar stores.292 The
ITFA's tax moratorium extends to November 14, 2014.293 Congress
could have included sales and use taxes in the moratorium, but specifi-
cally chose not to.294 This indicates that Congress's intent was to permit
295states to tax in-state sales that occur via e-commerce.
The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 (Fairness Act) 296 is Con-
gress's attempt to respond directly to the Court's holdings in Bellas Hess
and Quill.297 The Fairness Act addresses the Court's concerns by author-
izing states to tax Internet retailers if the states simplify their sales and
use tax policies.298 The Fairness Act, however, has yet to become law
although it passed the Senate in May of 2013.299 Proponents of the
bright-line physical presence rule may argue that Congress's inability to
take decisive action and pass the bill in the House demonstrates that
Congress has not resolved the issue, as the Court advised it could do.
However, this argument will likely not prevail because the Court has no
problem taking action in the face of congressional inaction when action
286. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
287. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1100, 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (1998).
288. Matthew G. McLaughlin, Comment, The Internet Tax Freedom Act: Congress Takes a
Byte out of the Net, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 212 (1998).
289. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101 (a).
290. Id. § l101(a)(2).
291. See Edwards, supra note 12, at 36.
292. McLaughlin, supra note 288, at 236 (explaining that sales taxes are permissible as long as
taxes on mail order and retail transactions are applied the same way).
293. Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024
(2007).
294. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101.
295. See generally Matthew Adam Susson, Comment, Thinking out Cloud: California State
Sales and Use Taxability of Cloud Computing Transactions, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 295, 313 (2013)
(explaining that states retain their ability to tax out-of-state vendors under the ITFA).
296. S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate, May 6, 2013).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 381-85.
298. S. 743 § 2. For a discussion on how states may simplify their sales and use tax policies
under the Fairness Act see infra text accompanying notes 386-87.
299. S. 743.
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is necessary. 30 0 To illustrate this point, the Quill Court noted that Con-
gress had made various attempts to pass legislation that would overrule
Bellas Hess's due process holding,30 but ultimately decided not to take
such action.302 Nevertheless, the Quill Court, noting the legislative at-
tempts, overruled Bellas Hess's due process holding despite Congress
failing to pass any law.30 3 Likewise, in the immediate situation, Congress
has recognized the DCC problem posed by Bellas Hess and Quill.304 Alt-
hough Congress has been unable to pass the legislation, the Fairness Act
is further proof that the physical presence test is irrelevant in the modem
era. Moreover, accounting for "a few thousand local tax rates is no long-
er an insurmountable technical, administrative, or financial burden."
305
Accordingly, the foundation for the Bellas Hess rule is no longer appli-
cable and adherence to it on stare decisis grounds is improper.
Although stare decisis is an essential consideration, it should not
trump other relevant factors.306 Some commentators, however, argue for
continued adherence to the physical presence requirement, because it
provides a plain rule and allows taxpayers to plan for tax compliance.
307
But the Court could have readily found that the advantages which stem
from the bright-line rule do not outweigh the disadvantages, such as the
enormous revenue states are losing out on as a result of Quill's physical
presence requirement.30 8 Additionally, the physical presence requirement
promotes perverse results, as Justice White pointed out.309 Moreover,
stare decisis only works if the precedent is still applicable.310 As dis-
cussed in detail above, Quill is no longer relevant in an era where com-
mercial transactions happen instantaneously and one-click transactions
are increasingly becoming the norm. Thus, continued observance of the
physical presence requirement on stare decisis justifications is not sensi-
ble.
D. Reconsidering the Economic Presence Test
Because Quill is irrelevant in the present era, analyzing and estab-
lishing a substantial nexus with state tax jurisdiction requires a new
300. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
301. In Quill, the Supreme Court overruled the due process holding of Bellas Hess, holding
that the Due Process Clause does not require physical presence in a state for the state to subject a
business to state tax jurisdiction. Id. at 306-08.
302. Id. at 318.
303. Id.
304. What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG,
http://www.marketplacefaimess.org/what-is-the-marketplace-faimess-act/what-is-the-MFA.pdf (last
visited June 27, 2014).
305. Id.
306. See Cory, supra note 250.
307. Smith, supra note 280, at 776; Stombock, supra note 114, at 1237.
308. See Cory, supra note 250.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 260-64.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 268-70.
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framework.3 ' Pragmatically speaking, an economic presence standard
makes sense in light of the modem economy' 2 in which economic ex-313-
ploitation is equivalent to physical exploitation.313 In other words, the
Internet and other technologies have transformed commerce to a point
where certain companies no longer need to maintain brick-and-mortar
stores in order to carry out business.1 4 In fact, businesses can exploit
markets more comprehensively with a digital presence than with a physi-
cal presence alone.3 15 Thus, it is sensible to apply a state tax jurisdiction
analysis that reflects the realities of e-commerce in the twenty-first cen-
316tury. The following Subparts describe how an economic presence
standard works and the public policy reasons for adopting an economic
presence test.
1. How Economic Presence Works
Economic presence refers to connections businesses have within a
state as determined by their economic contacts.3 17 This economic nexus
standard permits states to tax entities that do not have a physical presence
within state lines, but which conduct a sufficient amount of economic
activity within the state.318 Nexus refers to a business's relationship with
a state and the state's concomitant ability to tax that business.31 9 The
economic presence test's underlying principle is that economic realities
are significantly more relevant than traditional concepts of physical pres-
ence, particularly when considering if a business has a substantial nexus
with a state.320 Furthermore, the economic presence test considers the
benefits and opportunities an entity receives by doing business within the
321taxing state. It also accounts for actual physical contacts with the
state.322 Under this approach, "the state's infrastructure creates and main-
tains the consumer market and economic climate that fosters demand for
the seller's goods and services.'323 In other words, economic nexus oc-
311. See Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 195 (explaining that the economic nexus standard stems
from social and technological changes).
312. See id.; see also Joondeph, supra note 96, at 1]2-13.
313. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 195.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Under the Due Process Clause, economic presence is enough to impose state tax jurisdic-
tion on a business that does not have a physical presence within a state. See Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992). However, this Comment is concerned with the economic pres-
ence test as applied to the DCC. This Comment argues that the economic presence standard should
be extended to the DCC and Internet retailer cases because e-commerce may create the necessary
substantial nexus.
317. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 159; see supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
318. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 159.
319. Id. at 166.
320. R. Todd Ervin, State Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or Eco-
nomic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 531-32 (2000).
321. Id. at 532.
322. Id.
323. Id. (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 218 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 298
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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curs when a business creates a market within a state and derives revenue
from the established market.
324
More specifically, economic nexus is comprised of substantive ju-
risdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.32 5 Substantive jurisdiction deals
with a state's substantive connection with a business's revenue source,
whereas enforcement jurisdiction deals with a state's power over a busi-
ness.326 That is, substantive jurisdiction refers a state's ability to tax "the
subject matter of the exaction," such as goods or services consumed in-
side a state but purchased elsewhere.327 Enforcement jurisdiction in-
volves the power of a state to collect taxes from items it has substantive
jurisdiction over.328 This includes the question of whether a state has the
authority to enforce tax collection on an out-of-state retailer.
329
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the DCC requires states to
have substantive jurisdiction over the value or activity it intends to tax
and enforcement jurisdiction with the entity it imposes the tax on.330 Un-
der Quill, the Court held that a business needs to be physically present
within the taxing state to have the requisite substantial nexus with both
substantive and enforcement jurisdiction.331 The central premise of this
Comment, however, is that substantive and enforcement jurisdiction can
be established through economic presence.332 Further, the New Mexico
Supreme Court, in Barnesandnoble.com II, provides a practical frame-
work for analysis: substantive and enforcement jurisdiction is established
when a business "establish[es] and maintain[s] a market" in the taxing
state.
333
2. Public Policy Reasons for Adopting the Economic Presence Test
Tax policy in America reflects a utilitarian view that taxation is es-
sential in order to promote the overall good of society.334 By imposing
324. Id.; Julie Roman Lackner, Note, The Evolution and Future of Substantial Nexus in State
Taxation of Corporate Income, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1387, 1388-89 (2007).
325. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 166; see also Joondeph, supra note 96, at 113 ("Substantive
jurisdiction concerns a state's jurisdiction over the value or activity that it seeks to tax-the income,
the property, the sale, or the consumption, for example. Enforcement jurisdiction, in contrast, con-
cems a state's regulatory authority over the person or entity that it requires to pay or to collect the
tax.").
326. Id.
327. Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 3-4.
330. Joondeph, supra note 96, at 113.
331. See Patch, supra note 11, at 684-85.
332. It is widely understood that Quill's physical presence requirement only applies to sales
and use taxes. Smith, supra note 280, at 770. However, this Comment contends that the economic
presence test should apply to sales, use, and gross receipt taxes (the type of taxes at issue in the
Barnesandnoble. com II, Amazon, and Overstock cases).
333. Barnesandnoble.com II, 303 P.3d 824, 827 (N.M. 2013).
334. See Swain, supra note 254, at 374-75.
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and collecting taxes, the sovereign is able to pay for its operations.
335
Underlying the theory behind taxation are three fundamental values de-
signed to promote public policy goals: (1) equity, (2) efficiency, and (3)
administrability.336 An economic presence standard, as applied to Internet
retailers, better promotes the goals of tax policy. Therefore, there are
persuasive public policy reasons for adopting an economic presence
standard.
i. An Economic Presence Standard Promotes Equity
Tax policy should be fair.337 It should promote equity338 by ensuring
that all businesses that benefit from conducting activities within a state
are subject to state taxation.339 Otherwise, a corporation could exploit a
state's market while receiving the benefits and protection of the state, yet
evade state taxation.34° This would hardly be just. The basic premise of
the utilitarian view is that taxes are necessary for the sovereign to pay for
its expenditures.341 Consequently, if a corporation benefits from the sov-
ereign's functions it should pay for those expenses.342 For example, In-
ternet retailers profit from "the benefits and protections the State confers
in providing for a stable and secure legal-economic environment.9
3 43
Therefore, the economic presence test helps to ensure equity by requiring
all retailers that reap benefits from a state market-regardless of their
physical presence-to be exposed to the state's tax jurisdiction.34
In addition, application of an economic presence test is necessary in
order to avert further breakdown of tax equity between brick-and-mortar
and Internet retailers.34 5 For example, the New York Amazon tax,346
which requires Internet retailers to collect taxes from in-state consumers,
is aimed at "restor[ing] a level playing field" between in-state retailers
with physical stores and Internet retailers.347 Equity is achieved by ensur-
ing that Internet retailers without a physical presence do not remain free
335. Id.
336. Id. at 374.
337. See id. at 377.
338. Tax equity incorporates the principles of horizontal and vertical equity. Id. at 375. Hori-
zontal equity stands for the proposition that people that have an equal ability to pay should pay equal
taxes. Id. Likewise, vertical equity allows people with unequal abilities to pay taxes the ability to pay
different taxes. Id,
339. See id at 377.
340. See id. at 380 (arguing that if a business benefits from the ability to do business within a
state, the state is justified in subjecting the business to taxation).
341. See id. at 374-75.
342. See generally id. ("[T]he sovereign has clear normative authority to impose broad-based
taxes to fund its operations .... ").
343. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 28 (quoting Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal,
654 N.E.2d 954, 959 (N.Y. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. Swain, supra note 254, at 377.
345. John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate
Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419, 473 (2002).
346. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
347. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 9.
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from their obligation to collect state sales tax.348 In other words, it is fair
to tax an Internet retailer as if it were a retail store with a physical loca-
tion. This is particularly true when the Internet retailer profits from the
benefits and protections afforded by doing business within the state.349
Therefore, requiring Internet retailers to collect the same taxes brick-and-
mortar stores already have to collect promotes equity, because it allevi-
ates the disparity in state tax collection.350 Accordingly, an economic
presence standard advances tax equity.
ii. Efficiency is Enhanced with an Economic Presence Test
The economic presence standard educes market inefficiencies.35'
While tax policy should be efficient,352 many economists believe taxes
inherently create market inefficiencies.353 For instance, people may make
decisions based on their considerations of tax implications.354 A clever
consumer, for example, may drive to a no sales tax state to purchase a
particular product to avoid paying the tax.355 Such behavior creates fur-
ther inefficiencies in the market.356 When the primary motivation for
business activity is tax avoidance and that activity would not occur ab-
sent the specific tax scheme, the tax policy is producing greater ineffi-
ciencies than would otherwise occur.357 Therefore, the goal of tax policy
is more accurately stated as reducing inefficiencies because inefficiency
is intrinsic to any taxing scheme to begin with. 8
In keeping with this goal, an economic presence standard is better
suited to minimize inefficiencies.359 The physical presence test enables
out-of-state retailers to avoid paying taxes that similarly situated in-state
retailers have to pay.360 Economic behavior is therefore distorted.36' Un-
der the physical presence standard, businesses are encouraged to "engage
in the economically wasteful enterprise of rearranging their operations or
corporate structure solely to minimize their tax liability." 362 In contrast,
an economic presence standard would likely reduce the possibility for
363such inefficient tax avoidance strategies, because it does not provide
348. See id; see also Swain, supra note 345, at 473.
349. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1967), overruled by
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
350. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 29-30.
351. Swain, supra note 254, at 387, 389.
352. See id at 374.
353. Id. at 375.
354. Id. at 376.
355. Id. at 375-76.
356. Id.
357. Quinn T. Ryan, Note, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Re-
form, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 318 (2010).
358. See Swain, supra note 254, at 375-76.
359. See id. at 383-84.
360. See id; see also supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
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the same opportunities for businesses to avoid taxes through corporate
reorganization.364 Under an economic presence standard, businesses
would probably not have a high incentive to restructure because of a
state's tax jurisdiction over the exploited market.365 Stated another way,
the benefit of restructuring to avoid taxation would likely not outweigh
the benefit of exploiting a state market and the sales derived from that
market.366 Moreover, it is easier to change where goods are produced
than where they are consumed.367 Therefore, if a state has jurisdiction to
tax via the economic presence standard there is less market inefficiency,
because the risk of avoidance behavior is minimized.368 Thus, the eco-
nomic presence standard reduces market inefficiencies.
369
iii. Equity and Efficiency Gains Outweigh Administrative
Concerns and the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 Ad-
dresses Such Concerns
Another goal of tax policy is administrability.370 Taxpayers should
be able to easily calculate their potential tax liability and states should be
able to administer tax policy easily.371 Thus, the focus of administrability
is enforcement and compliance.37 2 Undue burdens should be avoided in
both areas.373 Although a physical presence rule arguably promotes ad-
ministrability interests, such concerns are overstated.37 4 The equity and
efficiency benefits arising from an economic presence standard outweigh
any enforcement or compliance burdens.375
Proponents of the physical presence standard argue that a bright-line
rule enables a taxpayer to easily determine whether the taxpayer will be
exposed to a state's tax jurisdiction.376 Admittedly, a simple rule does
promote clarity.377 However, this argument fails to consider the unjust
results that occur when bright-line rules are favored over rules that seek
to take into account modem realities.378 The problem with the physical
364. See id. at 384.
365. See generally Ryan, supra note 357, at 318 (analyzing the benefits of an economic pres-
ence standard with regard to state income taxes).
366. See generally Swain, supra note 254, at 387 (arguing that the economic nexus standard
reduces market inefficiencies).
367. Id.
368. See generally id. ("The economic presence test, coupled with a destination-based receipts
factor, dampens the effect of shifts in property and payroll because the receipts factor ensures that at
least some income is apportioned to jurisdictions exploited by economically present taxpayers."
(footnote omitted)).
369. Id. at 387, 389.
370. Id. at 374; see also Ryan, supra note 357, at 319.
371. Ryan, supra note 357, at 319.
372. Swain, supra note 254, at 389.
373. See id.
374. See id. at 389-90.
375. See id.
376. Id. at 389.
377. Ryan, supra note 357, at 320.
378. See id.
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presence argument "is that the physical presence test completely sacrific-
es the other tax policy values of equity and efficiency.'" 379 Conversely,
tax policy that incorporates an economic presence approach is more ca-
pable of addressing a wide array of circumstances,380 such as the Internet
retailer issue.
Further, there is a solution to the administrative concerns-the Fair-
ness Act. 381 Under the Fairness Act, states have the ability to tax Internet
retailers if they address administrative issues.382 The goal of the Fairness
Act is to deal with the issue of Internet retailers by "restor[ing] States'
sovereign rights to enforce State and local sales and use tax laws. 38 3 The
Fairness Act is Congress's response to Bellas Hess's and Quill's un-
workable physical presence rule.384 It provides states the option to re-
quire Internet retailers to collect sales and use taxes if states simplify
their tax laws.385 There are two options for states wishing to impose sales
and use taxes on Internet retailers: (1) adopting the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), s6 which is a mechanism formulated
by forty-four states and over eighty-five businesses that aims to make
sales tax collection simpler; or (2) meeting five simplification require-
ments listed in the Fairness Act:
* Notify retailers in advance of any rate changes within the
state
" Designate a single state organization to handle sales tax reg-
istrations, filings, and audits
" Establish a uniform sales tax base for use throughout the
state
* Use destination sourcing to determine sales tax rates for out-
of-state purchases (a purchase made by a consumer in Cali-
fomia from a retailer in Ohio is taxed at the California rate,
and the sales tax collected is remitted to California to fund
projects and services there)
379. Swain, supra note 254, at 390.
380. Ryan, supra note 357, at 320.
381. S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate, May 6, 2013).
382. MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, supra note 304.
383. S. 743.
384. MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, supra note 304.
385. Id.
386. Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Bd., Inc., Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement, (as amended October 30, 2013),
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA As Amended 10-
30-13.pdf [hereinafter SSUTA]. The SSUTA is an agreement among participating states to cooperate
in tax compliance on a multistate level and provides model sales and use tax laws participating states
must adopt. See id. For an in-depth discussion of the SSTUA, see John A. Swain, Reforming the
State Corporate Income Tax: A Market State Approach to the Sourcing of Service Receipts, 83 TUL.
L. REV. 285, 336-41 (2008).
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Provide software and/or services for managing sales tax
compliance, and hold retailers harmless for any errors that
result from relying on state-provided systems and data 
387
Therefore, the Fairness Act addresses administrative concerns. However,
after passing the Senate with a vote of 69 to 27, the bill was referred to
the House Judiciary Committee where it has stalled.388 Nevertheless, the
equity and efficiency gains of an economic presence test outweigh ad-
ministrative concerns. Furthermore, the Fairness Act, should it pass the
House and be signed by the President, provides an answer to the admin-
istrative issues. Therefore, the benefits derived from an economic pres-
ence test offset administrative concerns, which will be addressed once
Congress passes the Fairness Act.
In sum, the economic presence test should replace Quill's irrelevant
physical presence requirement because of the transformation of the na-
tional economy in the Digital Age. A substantial nexus can be estab-
lished when a state has substantive and enforcement jurisdiction because
of a retailer's economic presence within a state. Additionally, there are
persuasive public policy reasons to replace the physical presence re-
quirement with an economic presence test. Equity and efficiency are
increased and outweigh any administrative concerns. The Fairness Act
also provides solutions to some enforcement and compliance issues.
Therefore, the economic presence test is superior to the outdated Quill
test, and the Barnesandnoble.com H court provides a workable frame-
work for the analysis. Specifically, a state has substantive and enforce-
ment jurisdiction over an out-of-state retailer when the retailer establish-
es and maintains a market within the state.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the DCC is to prevent states from burdening inter-
state commerce. By requiring a retailer to have a substantial nexus with a
state before it is exposed to the state's tax jurisdiction, undue burdens on
interstate commerce are avoided. However, the Quill Court's affirmation
of Bellas Hess's bright-line physical presence requirement is a relic of
the past and should be treated as such. And as states have suffered mas-
sive budget shortfalls, in part as a result of their inability to tax Internet
retailers, they have attempted to experiment with laws that would enable
them to establish tax jurisdiction over Internet retailers. But different
courts have come to different conclusions and there is sense of national
uncertainty regarding Internet retailers and the bounds of state taxation.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity present-
ed in the Amazon and Overstock case to set a clear standard with respect
to Internet retailers and state taxation. In addition, the Court should have
387. MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, supra note 304.
388. See id.
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overruled the physical presence requirement, because Internet retailers
can comprehensively exploit state markets regardless of geography or
physical presence. Thus, any vestiges of a physical presence standard are
irrelevant in today's Internet and technology driven society. Further, the
Quill Court's adherence to Bellas Hess on stare decisis grounds was arti-
ficial, as the Court admitted. Therefore, the Court should not adhere to
the existing precedent, because it is no longer applicable. Rather, the
proper test is the economic presence standard, which advances tax equity
and efficiency.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's approach in Barnesandno-
ble.com II provides a practical approach for analyzing Internet retailer
cases. The court's holding-that a substantial nexus is created when a
business establishes and maintains a market within a state-is an appro-
priate way to evaluate Internet retailer cases in the twenty-first century.
Moreover, economic presence, as determined by a retailer's economic
activity within a state and the benefits and opportunities a retailer re-
ceives by conducting business within the state, is a proper way to analyze
a state's tax jurisdiction over state substantive and enforcement jurisdic-
tion. Under this approach, corporate relationships with in-state entities
may create a substantial nexus if there is direct affiliation through the use
of common trademarks and business policies. Furthermore, a cross-
marketing strategy, which provides an Internet retailer with a competitive
advantage over its counterparts, also indicates a substantial nexus with
the state. Also, any systematic solicitation and exploitation of a state's
market could give rise to a substantial nexus. In addition, if Internet re-
tailers have affiliate agreements with in-state residents that aid the retail-
er in establishing and maintaining a market in a state, the retailers would
have a substantial nexus and would be exposed to state taxes. In short,
the economic presence test should be adopted. It better enhances tax pol-
icy goals and addresses the e-commerce realities of the Digital Age.
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